INTRODUCTION
The judgments that company directors make can have significant consequences, for their companies, for those who hold stakes in companies, such as shareholders and employees and, at times, the wider community.
1 Consequently most jurisdictions impose duties on directors to guide and control the way that they act. Despite this, the courts have often refrained from holding directors liable for alleged breaches of the duties, 2 instead deferring to directors'
judgments. 3 Courts have simply not been willing to substitute their judgment for that of One leading reason is that judges wish to avoid 'hindsight bias,' namely 'the tendency of decisionmakers to attach an excessively high probability to an event simply because it ended up occurring.' : C Jolls, C Sunstein, and R Thaler, 'A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics ' (1998) directors. This approach has led, in some jurisdictions, to the development of the business judgment rule (BJR), through either case law as in Delaware in the US or legislation as in Australia. While subject to different formulations across jurisdictions, this essentially provides that if a director's action or inaction can be categorised as a business judgment, the director is presumed not to be liable for what has been done or not done unless the claimant can rebut the presumption that the rule applies. This is generally an arduous task. While no such rule has been officially recognised in the UK 4 this approach has been adopted in a broad range of cases, and is not confined to situations in which directors are being sued for breaching their duty of care. To be clear the paper is not concerned with the empirical question of how boards actually function and take decisions, nor with the scope and application of the BJR, about which much has been written, but rather the foundational question of how to identify and define the legal concept of business judgment. This is important for several reasons. First, categorising a matter as a business judgment can provide directors with a powerful shield from liability which raises questions about the appropriate extent of directors' accountability. This has been a contentious issue especially since the Global Financial Crisis when, despite queries being raised over their management of banks, few directors were subject to legal action for breaching their duties to their companies. 6 It has been argued that appropriate director accountability is a necessary element in legitimising directors' exercise of power. 7 However without a better understanding of what is protected under the label of business judgment, there is a risk that this exercise of power will lose legitimacy, with a resulting loss of trust in business.
Identifying what a business judgment is, and so what kinds of actions/decisions of directors are not challengeable and those that might be, is also necessary to promote commercial certainty. 8 In addition, the lack of clarity around the concept raises the possibility that the courts may not be identifying decisions as business judgments in a principled, consistent manner. The aim of the paper is both positive and normative. First, it ascertains how the courts have defined business judgment in order to establish greater certainty about how judges approach this question. It argues that the courts appear to identify entrepreneurial judgment as business judgments. If this is not the case the paper adopts the normative position that it should be, because this provides a coherent rationale for identifying why some decisions directors take are business judgments, and others are not.
The paper is structured as follows. By way of prefatory remarks, section two explains how we identified material business judgments in England and Wales. This is not a straightforward task, as the courts do not necessarily adopt the terminology of business judgment to signify when a director's judgment will be respected. Section three analyses how the courts approach the notion of judgment. It identifies two senses of the term, one being 'the exercise of an ability', the other being 'decision'. Section four examines how the courts identify judgments as 'business' judgments. Section five argues that business judgments can be conceptualised as entrepreneurial judgments. The article finishes with concluding thoughts on the nature of business judgment.
IDENTIFYING BUSINESS JUDGMENT IN ENGLAND AND WALES
Determining the parameters of business judgment is difficult in England and Wales because although it has been asserted that a court 'does not interfere with the business judgment of directors in the absence of allegations of mala fides', 9 in fact the courts rarely use the term Thus judgment can mean an ability to make a considered decision or to come to sensible conclusions. 16 The word can also mean a decision made. 17 The case-law indicates that judges regularly embrace both of these aspects of judgment. In general circumstances judges will frequently use the phrase 'in my judgment' (indicating an opinion based upon ability and experience), followed by a view or conclusion of the law and/or facts, and, of course, the judgment which a judge delivers involves making a decision on a litigated issue.
Judges also refer to the written judgments of other judges, which encapsulate a decision, either on the law or the facts or on both. course to follow, exercising their business judgment. 37 The notion is that a decision follows from the administrators using their ability. While with the decision meaning of judgment the actual making of a decision is obviously critical, there are indications from the Delaware and Australian case law that the notion of judgment is not simply limited to one final decision, such as the decision to make a takeover bid for another company or to enter a new industry. The decision to make a takeover bid, for example, is not the only part of business judgment, for business judgment also includes other actions that precipitate a final decision, such as the analysis undertaken by the directors of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. 50 In many cases judgment appears to include both the matters that lead up to a final decision as well as the final decision itself. The fact is that generally some of the case law indicates that making a judgment is a process. Save for very instant judgments that are made by directors without consideration of any note, something that is rare, there will be several elements to a decision, and in exercising a judgment a director is taking into account several things.
In this regard, the Delaware version of the BJR provides a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, and so a final decision is only made at the end of a process of inquiry. Boards do not satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the company without assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the organisation that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation's compliance with law and its business performance. making judgments on what they ascertain from their inquiries which will lead to a final decision about a matter. 52 The US courts do look at process to ascertain whether the directors were well-informed; they focus on the decision making process and not merely the contents of the final decision. drawing conclusions from those inquiries as well as making decisions about the judgments of others and these might be seen as stages in the process of making a final decision or judgment.
What stands out is that 'judgment' in the sense of a decision, is not so much an event, like a final decision to enter into a sale of an asset of the company, but more of a process that leads up to a decision. The process is part of the decision and what is done leading up to the decision can be seen as part of judgment. Thus, is it possible to say that a court might assess one aspect of a series of judgments that leads to a final decision or are all of them protected from scrutiny? If a director were to undertake careful consideration of all aspects relevant to making a final judgment including taking advice, making inquiries, seeking views and generally engaging in due diligence and then he or she makes a decision which might be viewed as extraordinary given all of the things that he or she found out, and it causes the company loss, are courts going to refrain from holding the director liable? What if a director engages in several judgments before he or she makes a final decision, but one of the preliminary judgments was clearly wrong, does that mean that the director is able to be held liable? Hitherto, there does not appear to be any case law in England, the US or Australia that addresses these issues. Indeed, it is submitted that the correct explanation of many of the cases addressing business judgment is that a decision is not an unconnected event -it is a process. In the process that leads to a final decision directors will engage in inquiries and reflection at various stages before making decisions that all feed into the final decision.
Finally, in some instances the courts do not make it clear whether they are referring to judgment in the ability or decision sense. This may well be ex-post rationalisation and the outcome of Barings seems clearly correct. 105 Nevertheless it demonstrates that what is categorised as a failure to exercise judgment at one point in time may be the product of earlier decisions regarding first how responsibilities should be distributed within the company, and secondly the degree of supervision that is appropriate after delegation. We have seen that whilst the status of the second is unclear, the first is a business judgment, for as Romer J stated in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd : 'the larger the business carried on by the company, the more numerous and the more important the matters that must of necessity be left to the managers, the accountants, and the rest of the staff'. As argued previously, decision-making is a continuous process that can require a number of decisions preceding the final decision. These include decisions regarding the amount of information directors should obtain in order to understand the nature of the company's business, and to come to properly informed decisions. Whilst Parkinson argued that 'deciding how much information to obtain, given the cost in time and money of obtaining it, in itself demands the exercise of judgment,' 107 it is unclear whether the English courts will treat these as business judgments, or matters that precede business judgments.
Some cases adopt the latter approach. In Re Paycheck, the director's failure to obtain advice from specialist insolvency practitioners led Mark Cawson QC to conclude that the director lacked information necessary to conduct a 'properly informed balancing exercise'
and to 'exercise a judgment' regarding whether to continue to pay dividends. 108 In Re Sunrise
Radio Ltd 109 , whilst the price at which shares should be offered on a share allotment was deemed to be a matter of commercial judgment, H.H. Judge Purle QC indicated that the advice of an independent valuer should be sought before making that judgment. In contrast, in ARB International Ltd v Baillie, 110 Robin Knowles QC held that the failure to get legal advice was a matter of judgment for which the director should not be criticised, given the costs and its uncertain benefits. 111 The status of these judgments is therefore unclear. the company and alterations to its register of members, which are different from commercial matters.
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Similarly in Australia, the Company and Securities Law Review Committee thought that 'matters relating principally to the constitution of the company or the conduct of meetings within the company' were not business judgments. 117 Meanwhile Sealy has argued that the courts are willing to police directors' decisions on these matters usually through finding that such decisions amount to the abuse of power for an improper purpose, 118 but it is unclear whether this indicates that these either are not business judgments or are business judgments that courts will not defer to because of impropriety.
In sum, the case-law demonstrates that the courts do differentiate between different categories of decision. However they do not articulate why they do so, and so why a decision is a business judgment. This makes it difficult to assess whether the courts' approach is coherent, which in turn undermines certainty. However, as discussed previously, the courts characterise business judgment in the ability sense as entrepreneurial. 119 Arguably therefore business judgments in the decision sense are those that require directors to exercise entrepreneurial ability. Certainly the need to promote and shield entrepreneurial judgment is frequently cited by policy-makers and academics as a justification for the business judgment to lie with the shareholders, and control, which resides with the board and management, has led to assertions that there is no entrepreneur. 127 If so, it would follow that there was no entrepreneurial judgment. Nevertheless Knight asserted that directors in these companies would exercise judgment 'as if they are entrepreneurs' (italics added).
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For this to be true, directors' business judgments must incorporate several elements:
first, directors must exercise the same approach to risk taking as entrepreneurs. Secondly, as
Knight argues, they should generally have greater skill than others to judge risks. Thirdly, as explained below, their judgments must be informed by, and designed to advance, the interests of the entrepreneurial risk-bearer. As an aside, this arguably is the company, not the shareholders, because shareholders are diversified and have limited liability and so are not fully exposed to, and have hedged the risk of, management making poor decisions. 129 In contrast the company is the risk bearer as it will bear the losses from directors' decisions and its assets are at stake.
Turning to the first element, the idea that entrepreneurs are more willing to take risks echoes the dicta of the court in Overend v Gurney that directors display a greater willingness to take risks than the general population. However entrepreneurial judgment is not concerned with risk taking per se, but with risk taking that balances risk against economic reward, taking into account the entrepreneur's exposure to the downside of the risk in question.
Entrepreneurs are 'responsible' owners. 130 The classic entrepreneur is therefore Adam adverse, 136 or more accountability through the duty of care if they took too much risk. 137 In any event, in England, most case-law relating to alleged directorial breaches involves director-shareholders in small closely held private companies. Although these do, in theory, have the benefit of limited liability, which could increase risk taking, many directors have personally guaranteed corporate debts, which may make their risk appetite more akin to The final issue with conceptualising directors' business judgment as entrepreneurial judgment is that, as owners of the business, entrepreneurs exercise judgment on their own behalf, and directors do not. Knight asserted that this created a fundamental difference between the judgment of even very senior 'hired managers' on the one hand, and that of 'the man of business on his own account' on the other. Whereas'(t)he former has had his task cut out for him by others and been set to perform it; the latter has cut out his own task to fit his own measure of himself and set himself at it.' 140 Entrepreneurial judgment is therefore distinctive in that it is informed by, and designed to advance, the entrepreneur's business interests. The judgment of hired managers and employees, though it may entail the exercise of a great deal of discretion, can only advance a plan designed to promote the interests of another, 141 though they may incidentally benefit from their decisions through increased remuneration or improved reputation.
Puzzlingly Knight himself did not consider that directors were hired managers, 142 but executive directors certainly are, and even non-executive directors are not in business on their own account. In any event, he thought that directors would be psychologically motivated to act like entrepreneurs because 'the 'personal' interests which our rich and powerful businessmen work so hard to promote are not personal interests at all…. theory that holds that directors will identify with their company and so act as responsible stewards.
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Agency theorists disagree, arguing that because directors are not owners they will shirk and pursue their own interests. 145 Adam Smith similarly argued of directors of joint stock companies that:
(B)eing the managers rather of other people's money than of their own it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which partners in a private company frequently watch over their own.
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However whilst the empirical question of how directors act has not been settled, the law imposes fiduciary duties that not only prohibit directors from pursuing their interests instead of the company's, but also a positive duty requiring directors to take decisions that are informed by the company's interests. Thus s.172 of the Companies Act 2006 stipulates that a director must 'act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole' (italics added). Section 172 is therefore targeted at directors' judgment. It requires directors not just to set aside their own interests when making judgments, but to also make judgments that are directly influenced and shaped by the company's interests. In effect the law requires directors to take decisions as if they were the entrepreneurial risk-bearer, the company. The fact that courts will not defer to directors' decisions that are tainted by conflicts of interest or bad faith, is consistent with the conception of business judgment as entrepreneurial judgment. These decisions may display entrepreneurial ability in terms of risk taking and risk assessment, or even in terms of creativity and innovation, but they are not informed by, and do not advance the interests of the corporate enterprise and so should not be protected business judgments.
In sum, it is possible to conceptualise business judgment in the ability sense as entrepreneurial judgment: it is consistent with the scope and application of directors'
fiduciary duties, and with the focus on risk-taking in discussions of directors' judgment.
b) Entrepreneurial Judgment and Business Decisions
Viewing business judgment as entrepreneurial judgment also provides a coherent framework for distinguishing between the decisions that directors take that are linked to the different roles they perform, and in particular the entrepreneurial role.
To explain, the Higgs Report identified directors as having distinct functions of wealth creation and monitoring. The former maps onto the entrepreneurial function, whilst the latter is key to a corporate governance role. 154 Higgs was concerned with non-executive directors, who are expected to discharge a monitoring function at board level, but these comments could also apply to executive directors who must monitor management below board level. 155 Higgs is not alone in this approach: the literature also identifies boards as Yet monitoring is a central board function in the dispersed share-ownership company.
As Middleton J stated in ASIC v Healey, 'it was a core irreducible requirement of directors to be involved in the management of the company and to take all reasonable steps to be in a position to guide and monitor'. 166 In large companies, particularly if the board is primarily staffed by part-time non-executive directors, it may be the board's core function; the management/entrepreneurial function will be peripheral.
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Monitoring and supervision therefore are important because they fall within the board's corporate governance role. Judgments on these matters perform different functions from entrepreneurial judgments. Unlike entrepreneurial judgments, monitoring does not necessarily involve decisions about how to drive the business of the enterprise forward.
While entrepreneurial judgments entail the exercise of discretion, monitoring operates as a constraint on that discretion, being directed at mitigating agency costs-that is, the risk that managers will pursue their own interests rather than the company's. In sum the courts' reluctance to recognise monitoring as involving business judgment is consistent with linking business and entrepreneurial judgment and with the claim that decisions that enlist the board's governance role are less likely to be deferred to as business judgments.
As discussed above, decisions relating to seeking information are dealt with inconsistently by the courts. Assuming these decisions are treated as judgments, whether they can be treated as business judgments or not could turn on whether the information was needed for entrepreneurial purposes, such as the valuation of an asset that the company proposes to dispose of, or for corporate governance purposes such as monitoring. The failure to make this distinction may underpin the lack of clarity about how such decisions should be approached.
Finally, the entrepreneurial/governance distinction also provides a coherent rationale for the courts' approach to internal management decisions. Decisions relating to internal management are not obviously entrepreneurial in terms of advancing the interests of the enterprise in wealth creation. Rather they are more concerned with the interests of corporate constituents such as shareholders, and can raise issues of corporate governance, particularly the constitutional balance of power. However if some constitutional decisions are entrepreneurial in nature, they could be classified as business judgments.
In sum identifying whether decisions are more closely linked to the directors' entrepreneurial or corporate governance functions can provide a rationale for classifying some decisions as business judgments to which the courts will defer, and others as decisions to which they will not defer. Decisions that are considered core business judgments are comfortably linked to the entrepreneurial role and require the exercise of entrepreneurial ability. Decisions that are still considered business judgments, but intuitively recognised as 'less business' are indirectly linked to wealth creation and do not usually raise governance issues. However the more closely a decision is linked to the corporate governance function, the more reluctance courts show to classifying it as a business judgment that they will defer to. Such decisions are also less likely to require the exercise of entrepreneurial ability.
Decisions will not always fall solely within either the entrepreneurial or the governance function, but will rather lie along a spectrum between the two: this will create disagreement about their classification and treatment. Nevertheless the concept of business judgment advanced here provides a framework for a principled debate regarding how such disagreement should be resolved.
CONCLUSION
Business judgment is an ill-defined but nuanced concept. We found that the courts utilise two meanings of the term judgment. One defines it in terms of experience and ability, the second in terms of decisions. It has been argued that when the courts consider what distinctive abilities directors have, they think of entrepreneurial ability. Meanwhile the courts tend to categorise as business judgments decisions that can be linked to the directors' entrepreneurial role; those that are not so categorised, or about which there is ambivalence, are more likely to be linked to the corporate governance role, and not connected, or less so, to the entrepreneurial role. Consequently identifying business judgment with entrepreneurial judgment fits with judicial practice and provides a means of identifying and differentiating between the different types of decisions that directors take.
This analysis opens up important avenues for future research. For example the question of whether the manner in which the courts conceive judgment and the decisionmaking process is an accurate reflection of how directors and boards actually function in practice needs exploration. A concept that diverges from boardroom reality could be problematic in terms of its utility and legitimacy as a mechanism for promoting director accountability, or for shielding directors from accountability.
Again the question of whether directors do in fact exercise entrepreneurial judgment, whether it is desirable for them to do so, and the relevance of context, requires investigation.
Directors in dispersed share-ownership companies may be less risk adverse than, but have similar skills in assessing risk as, the classic entrepreneur. The reverse may be true in ownermanaged companies. If neither group actually display entrepreneurial qualities it may be necessary to reconsider the basis for protecting their judgments. This is not to suggest that their decisions should necessarily be subject to greater review: rather that the question of how to approach different types of directors' judgments needs more nuanced consideration. This includes considering whether it is desirable to apply judicial deference to decisions that are entrepreneurial in nature, rather than non-entrepreneurial decisions. This article establishes a new framework for that debate: by identifying that the courts do distinguish between different judgments, and by offering a principled basis for these distinctions, it suggests that the rationales for protecting or scrutinising different types of judgments could vary in nature and weight, something that previous academic discussion has not addressed.
Attaching the label business judgment to almost everything directors do, or alternatively using the business judgment label to simply signal that the court will not review a judgment, or impose liability, obfuscates these differences. It is also unhelpful: it leads to the perception that the immunity from accountability provided by judicial deferral to directors' decisions arises due to the directors' office, and it creates a degree of uncertainty concerning for what directors will be accountable. 'Director exceptionalism' is not easy to defend in a society increasingly concerned with the accountability of powerful actors.
Focusing attention on the nature and social utility (or otherwise) of directors' judgments constructively reframes the debate.
